



**The Logical Empiricism and the Construction of a Behavior
Science: Difficulties and limits to the studies of mental
functions**

**O Emprirismo Lógico e a Construção de uma ciência do
comportamento: Dificuldades e limites no estudo das funções
mentais**

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Abstract

The comprehension of the so called mental functions, defined as internal states have been one of the greatest goals of Psychology and Philosophy and, nowadays, of the Neural Science. This essay intends to, from an epistemological approach, present and to discuss some theoretical and methodological difficulties and limitations which come from the influence of some epistemological and ontological positions about internal states and that influenced the construction of a behavior science. Among those positions it will be highlighted the conceptions of the positivism, logical empiricism, which is characteristic from the Vienna Circle and Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought in relation to the private language.

Keywords: psychology, behaviorism, mental function, logical empiricism, mind philosophy.

Resumo

A compreensão das chamadas funções mentais, concebidas como estados internos, tem sido um dos grandes objetivos da Psicologia e da Filosofia e, atualmente, das Neurociências. Este ensaio pretende, a partir de uma abordagem epistemológica, apresentar e discutir algumas dificuldades e limitações teóricas e metodológicas que surgem a partir da influência de algumas posições epistemológicas e ontológicas acerca dos estados internos e que influenciaram a construção de uma ciência do comportamento. No conjunto dessas posições daremos destaque às concepções do positivismo; do empirismo lógico, característico do Círculo de Viena e do pensamento de Ludwig Wittgenstein, em relação à linguagem privada.

Palavras-Chave: psicologia, behaviorismo, funções mentais, empirismo lógico, filosofia da mente.

Introduction

In "The Magic Lunette" (1869), a Joaquim Manuel de Macedo work (1820-1882), Simplicio, myopia's severely affected person, eager to see normally gets from an Armenian, a spotting scope with which could see things perfectly and not that Simplicio so wished, but he could see the evil within people if the scope was fixed for more than three minutes. Although the Armenian has warned that Simplicio should not be done, the temptation to see others interiors was stronger and Simplicio almost goes crazy. Accidentally the scope is broken and Simplicio calls another, but with the safeguard that the instrument showed only the good in people. Effect? Simplicio's problems didn't end. Quite the contrary. Simplicio is duped for the people! (Macedo, 1960 [1869]). Understand the use of "scope" and the theoretical and methodological presuppositions on which were based the construction of the lunette is fundamental to the understanding of its flaws or limitations, as well as of the practical consequences of such failures. This essay intends to, from an epistemological approach, present and discusses some theoretical and methodological limitations and difficulties that arise with the influence of some

ontological and epistemological positions about internal states and which exerted a certain influence on the construction of a behavior science.

The Development of Scientific Psychology and the Assumptions of Logical Empirism

Even in the early 20th century, Maher (1900) defined, in line with the Aristotelian view, the soul or the mind as psychology object. (Aristotle, 1950 [330/322 BC]; Sarbena & Raffaelli, 2003). However, in 17th and 19th centuries, in the presence to physics new discoveries, in particular the Newton's physics (1643-1727), as well as the metaphysics critique, resulting from the Comte's positivism (1643-1727) Aristotle's vision of the world happens to be questioned. The late 19th and early 20th century's psychology, influenced by Weber's (1795-1878) and Fechner's works (1801-1887), experience advances in Psychophysics' area and, by the influence of this shall assume an external sense science character (Abib, 1996; Soares, 2004). This movement, which goes from the 17th century's end to the early 20th century, was influenced by the spreading of positivist thought, especially by the objectivity's ideal (Canguilhem, 1958). Wundt (1832-1920),

also experiencing the natural sciences' development and the objectivity's ideal, resorted to experimental method Physiology's characteristic and to the comparative method and analysis proper from epoch's philosophy and anthropology (Penna, 1997; Barreto, 2008). Thus, Wundt's Experimental Psychology, by these methodologies characterized, has constituted a hybrid discipline, marked by both the scientific rigor of Physiology as the assumptions of philosophy. In relation to this move, Gomes (2005) notes that study's object and, consequently, the methodology has varied, from epistemological perspectives, between metaphysics and science.

In psychology's area, the objectivity's criterion leading advocate was Watson (1878-1958), Methodological Behaviorism's founder, which sought to delimit philosophy and psychology's fields, printing, thus, to psychology, an eminently scientific status (Watson, 1913; 1924). However, the Methodological Behaviorism proposal not only reinforces the objectivity's criterion, as falls within the Objectivism context by proposing the introspectionist method elimination, characteristic from Wundt's though, as well William James (1842-1910) functionalism, which, it is important to highlight, not dismissed as an object of Psychology's study the consciousness

(James, 1916). Yet in this context, but from a structuralism perspective, Titchener (1867-1927) defines the psychology's object is the conscience. From the analytical method, Titchener's Structuralist Psychology sought not causal relations between psychological experiment and the nervous system (Gondra, NNN1997). It is noteworthy that epoch's psychology, despite the implementation of objective/objectivist criteria supported in natural sciences methodologies, had in the introspectionist method the only "magic lunette" to study the internal States.

Watson's scientific Psychology, abandoning the introspectionism and the mentalist perspective that characterized structuralism and functionalism, adopted a scientific model in accordance with the strictest of positivists canons, assuming the following assumptions: 1) psychology is objective and, therefore, must study a subject distinct from the observer; 2) only the observables' corporeal manifestations represent a communicable Knowledge and 3) the behavior study's foundation is the physiology/neurophysiology. (Merleau-Ponty, 1990 [1942]). As Max and Hillix (2001), the Behaviorism basic's assumptions from Watson can be described like: a) response elements include the behavior which can be reviewed by scientific, natural and objective methods; b) behavior is

reducible to physical-chemical processes, i.e., it's comprise by glandular secretions and muscle movements; c) behavior is maintained by strict determinism, i.e. all response occurs in some antecedent stimulus function and, d) conscious processes, if they exist, cannot be scientifically studied. In this theoretical context, it is worth mentioning that the assumptions arising from Pavlov's research

(1849-1936), particularly the conditioned reflex's theory, also served as guiding models for psychology's studies. From this perspective, as the model now adopted, the observation method was essential, considering, including that the observable behavior becomes the object of scientific Psychology. In this context, is underlining the need for rigorous training in registration and analysis procedures. This concern with scientific rigor characterized the Methodological Behaviorism. Thus, by virtue of not being liable to empirical verification, were excluded from the scientific agenda of the so-called epoch's "Scientific Psychology", phenomena such as consciousness and mental representations, denying the possibility of a subjective States or internal States study (Mcdougall, 1941).

The same assumptions that guided Scientific Psychology's construction, in particular the Methodological

Behaviorism, were shared by a thinkers group, which constitute the so-called Vienna Circle. That doesn't mean to say that the E.C. Tolman (1886-1959), C.L. Hull (1874-1952) and B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) neobehaviorism as well as the Radical Behaviorism methodological proposal, are Vienna Circle assumptions expressions. The contrary might be stated in relation to Methodological Behaviorism (Dittrich *et al.*, 2009; Helm, 2008; Lee; Abib, 2003; Smith, 1986). Prado Jr. on presentation of John Searle work "*The mystery of consciousness*" (1998, p. 13) points to the fact that:

"The logical empiricism [...], spontaneously accomplice of behaviorism [...], disqualifies the question of the subject or consciousness as authentically philosophical problem, seeing it perhaps the best example of false problems of "metaphysics", or as a myth to be dissolved, eliminated or "reduced" by objective thinking."

In 19th and 20th centuries philosophy reaches significant advances regarding the reflection about areas such as language, epistemology and logic. On these issues focused thinkers like Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and others connected to the so-called Vienna Circle. Russell proposed that the reality structure could be captured by logical structures, but for that we'll need a language that start from simple propositions, based on experience. In this context, conceptual precision would be essential (Russell, 1956; Granger, 1955).

The Vienna Circle, motivated by the relativity theories development and quantum mechanics, was constituted from 20th year, by a scientists and philosophers group, among which stood out, among others, Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Hans Hahn (1879-1934), Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) and Víctor Kraft (1880-1975). This current of thought proposed that the scientific statements were reduced to an empirical language, free from metaphysical assumptions (Carnap, 1993[1931]; 1988[1928]; Cassirer, 1963; Mosterín, 2000; Moore, 1985).

Such a current, also called neopositivism or logical positivism or, still, logical empiricism, was an attempt to unite the empiricism, especially of Hume

(1711-1776), with formal symbolic logic. The neopositivism had as central issue, the meaning general criterion search, from which, we could build an objective language, ideological and/or metaphysical assumptions free, that would serve as status in science. Thus, the central neopositivist thought is antimetaphysical trend, which is expressed mainly in the statements verifiability's issue as a criterion for its meaning (Bochensky, 1977; Cassirer, 1963). In this sense, the general meaning criterion would be closely related to the verifiability possibility, i.e. a proposition would have status of ' truth ', or better, have logical meaning, only from the scientific or empirical verifiability possibility. So, are only admitted as scientific or logical meaning holders, those reducible statements to fundamental or *Atomic* statements of experience (Russell, 1956). As a consequence, such criterion eliminates the validation possibility of metaphysical propositions, which would be reduced to a propositions series without sense (*non sense*) by the fact of not being liable to empirical verification (Haack, 2002; Kneale; Kneale, 1991).

It's important to clarify that sense and meaning, in G. Frege (1848-1925) tradition, are separate things. Frege believed that, to signs think (terms, sets of words.) we refer to different things: a) Meaning (*Bedeutung*), i.e., the designated

object by the sign and, b) the sign sense (sinn), which denotes the way in which we are given that object. While the meaning refers to the denotation, sense refers to the connotation (Abbagnano, 1982), that is, we say that an expression are sense, as Lalande (1996, p. 1001), when is "able to evoke strongly this mental activity kind". Russell (1956; 1995) and Wittgenstein (1994), by their turn, seek to reduce the sense to the meaning. Later introduces itself, in logical and semantics terms, the distinction between the 'types' or 'classes' of meaning. The meanings are classified into logical, factual and expressive. When a statement can be considered true or false, based on the terms that make up, i.e. whether the utterance has a true value (analytical) or a false value (contradictory), then we can say that it has a logical or formal meaning. When the statement truth value depends on the cognitive terms meaning and some facts to which it refers, then the statement have factual meaning. The logical and factual meanings usually are called cognitive or theoretical. The expressive meaning expresses a subject's mind state, that is, an utterance has expressive significance insofar as it expresses something concerning who the state expresses. Because of this, it is a statement that has no cognitive or theoretical significance (Hegenberg, 1995; Gortari, 1988). Thus,

according to this classification, the statements concerning the subjective/internal states, despite performing expressive significance, are theoretical/cognitive significance devoid.

Although it is not fair to say that the Radical Behaviorism is a neopositivism direct consequence, on the other hand, theoretical approaches between the Methodological Behaviorism and Vienna Circle assumptions are strong, especially as regards the verifiability criterion, as well, with respect to the position face to metaphysic. For example, for Methodological Behaviorism, the concepts that cannot be empirically verified, as for example, consciousness, representation, etc., have no cognitive-theoretical significance. But, if the concepts related to mental states is meaningless for this Scientific Psychology chain, due to verification impossibility- by 'scientific methods', you cannot say the same about the expressive meaning. In addition, it would be a mistake to identify the meaning, even if factual, with real existence, that is, you can't deny something ontological status just for being factual and logical meaning devoid. Therefore, the fact that determine the meaning lack of metaphysical propositions, does not them meaning relieve in frageana term acceptance, motive the *sense* does not end in meaning,

however, is not meaning devoid by the mere fact of being able to determine with clarity the mean this utterance and, for some, evoke some feeling kind. It is also important to emphasize that, in turn, the term or proposition meaning, cannot be to the name reduced or to this definition. For example, let's say someone who, affected by a neurological condition, had lost the ability to name objects. Such a person had lost the objects sense that can't nominate? That may be so, however, if, for example, she can't name the object, but maintain the ability to use it, I wonder if she lost the object sense? And was lost the meaning? We don't believe. (Soares, 2002).

But Scientific Psychology, refraining from mental states studying, gives a behavior account in its broad sense? I wonder if it would be appropriate to deny the mental categories, as do *eliminative realism* supporters, as Churchland (1997; 1990) in the present day? Does this 'scope', built from logical empiricism's assumptions, in addition to having been 'boring', does not constitute an extremely limited's instrument, not only in the methodological sense, but in reducing human behavior only to observable events sense? (Garcia, 2005; Serbena; Raffaella, 2003; Silva *et al.*, 2003). Many scholars have thought this way and attempting to put the so-called 'consciousness states' or 'mind states' in

the science agenda had marked most of the contemporary thought, not only in Philosophy's field as well as in psychology and, so called, Neurosciences field (Soares, 2004; 2011).

However, how to keep psychologism/Mentalism's distance when we study mental states, especially if such states are designed as private events, which only in a language translation also sense private? What is the relationship between this language and these states? (Soares, 2002). Before we continue this discussion, it is worth noting that, as Smith (1995), the private language has two senses: an epistemological and ontological one. The first arising from the fact that the words refer to what only the speaker can meet and someone else might assume; the second, due to the fact that, once the private language refers to immediate and private sensations, i.e. the sensations that belong to the speaker, cannot be owned by anyone else.

Internal States and private language

According to Wittgenstein (1889-1951), private language can be defined as a language that others can't understand; a language that can't be understood by another person (Wittgenstein, 1995 [1953]). In other words, Wittgenstein sets the private language as a language for

sensations; although later speak of other consciousness states, as the memory. The example chosen by Wittgenstein to start yours reflection about private language and consequently about the subjective states and, according to Gianotti (1995), serves as a paradigm for psychological concepts analysis, is the ' *pain* ', phenomenon, because it is purely subjective, or in own Wittgenstein terms (1980), be a consciousness state. The difference between *private language* and *common language* stems from the fact that the private language lacks man's natural behavior to explain words meaning. In private language the word meaning as the only benchmark the feel and his name. This implies that does not present an external reference (Smith, 1995), i.e. private language's question refers to the relationship between meaning and meaningful.

For Wittgenstein, the meaning is closely linked to the use they make of the terms. Wittgenstein will give to language various uses the name of *language games*. Language games can be identified as language functions, such as: "order and act according to orders; describe an object according to a description; reporting an event; make no assumptions about the event; raising a hypothesis and examine it [...]" (Wittgenstein, 1995 [1953], p. 21). In this

way, a term or an isolated proposition or its specific usage context, mean nothing in reality. Thus, we can affirm that, for Wittgenstein, is the *context* that gives meaning to the term or proposition. Interesting that Agostinho (354-430), according to medieval patristic tradition, so described in *Confessions*' work the words learning process:

"He retained everything in memory when he pronounced the name of something and when, according to that word, he moved the body to it. He saw and noted that gave to the object, when they wanted to designate it, a name that he pronounced. This wish was revealed to me by the body movements that are such as the natural language of all peoples [...]. By this process, he retained little by little the words conveniently arranged in several sentences and frequently heard as signs of objects[...]. (1966[397/398], p. 37-38)".

It is important to mention that for *Agostinho*, the relationship between words and reality (words/definition and stuff) is processed as follows: a word acquires meaning by its association with the object, i.e., the relationship is directly between *words* and *things*. Agostinho, although it

considers that ' things ' has a much more *reminiscent* function, also underlines the fact that ' mental images ' building from ' reality facts'. In other words, without denying the ability to fantasize, ideas and words would have reference set from the reality (Agostinho, 1966 [397/398]). In relation to fantasy, it is noteworthy that, Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), already in the scholastic tradition, but still moving in *augustinian* orbit, somehow provides an ontological status to fantasies, to elaborate, in the *Monologium* and *Proslogium*, his argument about God existence. (Gilson, 1986; Boehner & Gilson, 1991).

In natural language we learn the word 'pain' meaning of the associating it to a pain's natural behavior. As well as in Agostinho description, we learned the words from the association with objects. However, when applying an association model words-thing to the sensations we run the risk of also turning sensations in *things* in the material sense of term. To do this we apply our language logic for physical objects to our sensations language logic. With the tendency to apply the relationship between words-things model, according to Smith (1995), run a sensations 'objectification', that is, such a move would authorize, for example, to assert that words and things would have the same nature and that, therefore, share

the same properties. Such a premise would oppose, for example, Descartes' properties dualism (1596-1650) who conceived that *mental* has different properties from *physical* (Descartes, 1998 [1649]). Thus, according to properties dualism, the feeling would not be a physical object that can be studied according to the classical science model, whereas can only be 'measured' that which has extension. However, private language's concept is based on the assumption that only the individual who has the feeling may formulate a same representation. In this sense, this premise would be an application of *Association between words and things* model, which assumes that *mental representations* and *objects* would be the same nature, violating thus the properties differentiation? To Smith (1995) yes, because according to him, the private language, would be a model' object namesophistication when applied to sensations case.

However, according to Wittgenstein (1995 [1953]), if we consider that sensations are objects (*feeling-thing* concept), these would become, therefore, unnecessary to word's meaning. If I don't know what the other has when say 'I'm in pain', if I don't even know he has something, so whatever this 'thing' or his existence is irrelevant to word's meaning.

“If I tell myself I just know what the word “pain” means through the perception of my own case, then should I also to say that about the others? And how can I then generalize a case so irresponsibly? A person tells me about herself that only know what pain is by the perception of her own case! Suppose that every person has a box with something that we call “beetle”. No one can see what is on another box; and each person says that only knows what a beetle is by her own perception about the beetle. – Here it would be possible that each person had a different thing in her box. We can even conceive that the thing in the box was constantly changing. - But if the word “beetle” had, however, an use for these people? Then that usage would not be a designation of a thing. The thing in the box does not belong at all to the language game; not even as a simple something, because the box could be empty – No, the thing in the box is as a common factor in terms of a fraction: it allows to simplify it; whatever it is, it is eliminated. That is: If build the grammar of the expression of sensation from the “object and designation” paradigm, then the object, as irrelevant, is out of consideration (Wittgenstein, 1995, [1953] p. 357-358)”.

Interpret sensation as something private, to explain words meaning in order to sensation, lead to that interpretation own overcoming. Observe that Wittgenstein not express against sensations’ existence, but the way we understand them as objects or things. This is not to sensations deny, but to question a particular philosophical interpretation of it is feel, remember, etc. In short, we could say that the entire problem is in thinking sensations from the model '*name object* ', that is, the model that allows us to interpret a sensation as being something and not been something we, necessarily would have to deny their existence. However, to transform *the sensations in object*, allows us to meet her as if we knows something. This assumption of an ' internal perception ' analogous to external perception becomes possible thanks to sensation’s transformation in something analogous to externals things. If the interiors things knowing mode is the same way of knowing external things, so theoretically, the sensations knowing way and, we could add, the mental states, could be the same of the natural sciences. However, Wittgenstein points to the fact that feelings and things/objects describe are different activities:

“No doubt that I do not identify my sensation through criteria, but rather

make use of the same expression. But with it does not end the language game: with it starts the language game. But it does not begin with the sensation that I describe? – The word “describe” can delude ourselves. I say: “I describe my state of consciousness” and “I describe my room”. We can not forget the diversity of language games. (Wittgenstein, 1995[1953], p. 356)”

Based on this assumption, for Wittgenstein, the methodological Behaviorism error, for example, is to accept the *name-object model*, denying, like this, the sensations and subjective states existence on alleged objectivity behalf. (Wittgenstein, 1980). According to Wittgenstein (1995 [1953]), the feeling, and we can add, the consciousness states and mental representations, could not be as 'things' conceived, but also not as 'nothing'. Wittgenstein invites us to think the feeling with other categories other than the objects or things. Interesting to note that in *Remarks on The Philosophy of Psychology*, Wittgenstein (1980) indicates that Psychology's difficulties would result not from the simple appropriate instruments lack, a quantitative concepts lack, or even to a technical failure, but, above all, to conceptual confusion. In this perspective, Prado Jr (1998, p. 14) says:

Actually are conceptual confusions that led to this misunderstanding: it is the fear of focus in a metaphysical dualism that leads to admit the acceptance and understanding of mental phenomena that implies the affirmation of the existence of nonphysical entities on the beside the physical world.

The epistemological implications of Wittgenstein's position in relation to sensations status are immense. One would be the 'scope' limitation, built from the neopositivists canons and improved by natural sciences development, was built to see just 'things' (*res*). Gianotti (1995) points to the fact that, by insisting that "the pain" is a manifestation (*Äusserung*), Wittgenstein's 'point out that the concept relationship (which in this case is not formal) with their cases cannot be thought of as if it were that of a general concept embracing multiple objects. This according to him because:

“We do not give name to a sensation in the same way as we name a thing, and his concept can not be the characteristic note of this thing. Moreover, it builds the grammar of the expression of sensation according the “object and designation” model, the object is shown irrelevant. Not being constituted as an

object of my “inner perception”, it disappears the possibility of electing a purely subjective criteria to say firmly that only myself have my pain. It is inscribed in the grammar of “criteria” a intersubjective relationship, that born because the pattern is rule, impossible, therefore, to be applied privately. The immediate presence of pain is shown devoid of a principle of individuation. This is not to deny the existence of this pain, but simply it says that is not something, instead, that only finds its designation criteria in their collectively shared expression (Gianotti, 1995, p. 149-150)”.

However, considering the private language just has the word for sensation, can mere association with sensation grant meaning to the term? Without resorting to physical bodies, can the sign acquire meaning from their association with sensation? (Smith, 1995). In this case, considering, for example, first Wittgenstein’s position, i.e. the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, we could say that word’s *meaning understood* is to be able to give an explanation that fits the definition, in such a way that, to the extent that a definition gives me the word meaning and have some sort of definition, I can assign meaning to a sign. Thus, whereas a proposition has its significance determined by bipolarity, and whereas, according to *Association hypothesis*,

words and things have the same nature, then surely a type ' I have pain ' will proposition be true or false (Wittgenstein, 1994 [1921]). However, a problem arises: what reference criteria or, which objective criterion that allows me to actually assign the value proposition? If we admit a direct link between sensation and sign, for example, the way in which the *pain sensation is seized* presents itself as an *ostentatious definition* kind that would give the sign to your definition, that is to say, its meaning.

In this way we could distinguish between what is and what isn't pain. In other words, we could understand sign " pain " without resorting to any physical element, because that's what the subject would focus their attention on *internal sensation* and internally comment the word, producing therefore an association, offering a kind of sign *ostentatious definition*. Therefore, theoretically, according to Smith (1995), we could approximate Descartes’ objective language with private language theory exposed above, as for Descartes, the *ideas* also has an *objective reality*. Well, it is precisely this central point of the second Wittgenstein argument, i.e. that of the *philosophical investigations*, regarding private language. For him, featuring just the sensation, I am not able to set my sign, that is, I'm not able to assign meaning to

the sound that I relate to sensation, since everything seem right shall be taken as correct, which somehow represents an extreme subjectivism, given that there is no separation between a subjective instance for which something just seems correct. (Wittgenstein, 1995 [1953]).

Thus, in purely subjective sphere, we found no objective criteria that allow us to identify the correct usage and separate him of word's misuse. This way, Smith (1995), warns that the mere feeling isolated from any external reference is not able to fulfill that role, which fits to a physical object. The same consequences apply if we substitute sensations by mental states. As Gianotti (1995, p. 154):

[...]” the proposition in which someone says something about their subjective states, where it occurs the “I” pronoun, do not form statements about the internal state, do not form properties of a subject, as if described a private landscape, but they consist of an externalization of it. If I use “I” only to designate myself, it is not why I have a hard internal criteria for my own identity, thus ensuring the frontier between those mental states that are uniquely mine from those that are from others.”

Whereas in this way, it can be affirmed that it is necessary to resort to something public and observable, is own

body, are physical objects, so we can have criteria that allow us to distinguish between sensations. In this case, it would be preferable to say something like: what we call language only has meaning in a public context (Gianotti, 1995; Smith, 1995).

Wittgenstein (1995 [1953]) believes that subjective states representations are also limited by a *logical space*, i.e. it is not the fact of being the socially shared concept that gives the objectivity status, but the fact is, like all other facts, limited by the *logical space*. Hence the meaning owning this aura of indeterminacy, as suggested by Gianotti (1995). It should be noted, though, as does Prado Jr. (1998) that, in a *word*, the abstraction, the machinery, the pure syntax show itself as reference points *insufficient* for understanding and expression of lived experience, without which the idea of subjectivity or conscience loses all sense. This representation of subjective states cannot be conceived to molds of material things representations; otherwise, such the same mistake of conceiving mental states as *things*. Moreover, even *things* representation is problematic, if we adopt the “*ostentatious*” *definition* model.

Final Considerations

From the assumptions presented, we can identify difficulties and epistemological limitations in relation to the elaboration of a general and objective theory of valid meaning for all instances, especially for the subjective states/mental functions, as logical empiricism's assumptions. Such difficulties and limitations apply to Scientific Psychology idea, built to Methodological Behaviorism molds. However, such difficulties observation does not mean defending the existence or possibility of a private language, which would be inaccessible just to a "Magic Lunette", kind even considering Wittgenstein *logical space* idea. It may be necessary to the different spotting scopes development to study the mental states, rather than eliminate them of the scientific agenda. In this sense, we agree with Prado Jr. (1998) when he says that:

"The phenomenon of consciousness will not disappear (as it crumbles an illusion of a myth when opposes them the objective knowledge) if one day we come to determine their exact biological function: we will continue to feel pain, to dream and to solve mathematical problems (moreover, the tooth X-ray and the perfect diagnosis of the dentist never suppressed any pain)".

Is within language, within certain languages *regions*, which establishes the true and false distinction, between certainty and doubt, between right and wrong, between reality and fiction. Say that language might only be based in this private associations game that the individual could, ideally, create and play with yourself, is to say that the human being is the measure from real and faux, certainty and doubt, of right and wrong, of reality and fiction. However, such objectivity, as conceived by Scientific Psychology and Neopositivists, would only be possible if we believed that the *meanings* (which include the content of the claims, theories, conduct standards, personal experiences, mythological content, etc.) and the *representations* have an objective existence, in the sense of *thing*, regardless of the use that is made and the concrete context and identified with its shape, which would make it possible to design that, through the semantic and syntactic analysis, we could determine the meaning, which in reality is a fallacious idea, since we can't confound form (logical structure) and proposition content (meaning).

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